I am the Century Club Professor of Finance at the McCombs School of Business at the University of Texas at Austin. My work in matching theory has facilitated the design of many real-world mechanisms, including FCC spectrum auctions, kidney paired donation, and the redesign of the U.S. Army’s branching mechanisms for assigning cadets. Meanwhile, my work at the intersection of the theory of industrial organization and the field of law and economics has advanced our understanding of anticompetitive practices in real estate agency and other markets. Given this interdisciplinary agenda, my work has been published in journals in economics, law, political science, finance, computer science, and applied mathematics, including the American Economic Review, the Journal of Political Economy, the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and the Journal of Finance.
Research Interests
Market Design
I study market design, an engineering-oriented field of economic theory that considers how the design of the rules and regulations of a market affects the functioning and outcomes of that market. In particular, I study matching theory, a field of economics that studies markets in which agents have explicit preferences over whom they buy from and sell to, not just over the underlying goods bought and sold. Examples of such economies include the markets for medical residency positions, the assignment of students to public schools, and the formation of collaborative research enterprises. My work in market design has led to a deeper understanding of such diverse markets as kidney exchange, spectrum auctions, and assigning U.S. Army military cadets to branches of service.
Industrial Organization
Additionally, I now study how firms maintain non-competitive prices, particularly in non-concentrated industries. My work can help explain pricing patterns in initial public offerings, syndicated lending, real estate agency, and deposit banking.
Law And Economics
I also contribute to the law and economics literature by applying the principles of market design to understanding the effects of laws governing mergers and shareholder voting.
Political Economy
I also study federalism, and in particular how the assignment of tax and expenditure powers to either local or central governments affects economic policy. My work, both theoretical and empirical, has shown that competition between local governments leads them to enact policy which leads to better outcomes for citizens. In ongoing work, my collaborators and I are investigating the policy differences which account for these differences in economic outcomes; we find that wage differences explain a large portion of the difference in outcomes.
Teaching Interests
MBA/Undergraduate Teaching
I currently teach the introductory Managerial Microeconomics class at the McCombs School of Business; this class is required for all entering MBA students. The goal of this course is to help managers use game theory and other tools from microeconomics to think strategically about business decisions. Topics include decision theory, competitive markets, price discrimination, the hold-up problem, market entry, and adverse selection. A syllabus for this course may be found here.
Formerly, I taught a number of courses on advanced managerial strategy that focused on thinking strategically about decisionmaking in legal and regulatory contexts. In particular, these classes focused on using the tools of economics—particularly game theory—to enhance the ability of managers to make better decisions while interacting with regulatory agencies, engaging in behavior that may draw antitrust scrutiny, and formulating intellectual property strategies. A syllabus for one such course may be found here.
PhD Teaching
I am planning on teaching a class on market design to Ph.D. students in the Department of Economics at the University of Texas at Austin. This course focuses on the theory and practice of designing matching markets, auctions, and other institutions for exchange. The goal of the course is to not only provide a solid grounding in the field of market design but also to encourage students to make their own contributions in this field.
I have also taught a Ph.D. course on the foundations of political economy, covering social choice theory, the theory of elections, and standard models of lobbying.