WORKING PAPERS
Hidden Substitutes with Scott Duke Kominers.
Strategy-Proofness, Investment Efficiency, and Marginal Returns: An Equivalence with Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers.
Existence of Stable Matchings in Large Markets with Complementarities with Eduardo M. Azevedo.
Published Research
Stability, Strategy-Proofness, and Cumulative Offer Mechanisms with Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp, in the Review of Economic Studies.
Chain Stability in Trading Networks with Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp, in Theoretical Economics.
Full Substitutability with Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp, in Theoretical Economics.
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts: Corrigendum with Ravi Jagadeesan and Scott Duke Kominers, forthcoming in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics.
Multilateral Matching: Corrigendum with Keisuke Bando, Toshiyuki Hirai, and Scott Duke Kominers, in the Journal of Economic Theory.
The Design of Debt Clearing Markets: Clearinghouse Mechanisms in Pre-Industrial Europe with Lars Börner, in the Journal of Political Economy.
Stable and Strategy-Proof Matching with Flexible Allotments with with Scott Duke Kominers and Alexander Westkamp in the American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings.
Contract Design and Stability in Many-to-Many Matching with Scott Duke Kominers in Games and Economic Behavior (2017).
Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach with Fuhito Kojima and Yusuke Narita in Journal of Economic Theory (2017).
Price Controls, Non-Price Quality Competition, and the Nonexistence of Competitive Equilibrium with Charles R. Plott and Tomomi Tanaka in Games and Economic Behavior (2016).
Multilateral Matching with Scott Duke Kominers in the Journal of Economic Theory (2015).
Many-to-Many Matching with Max-Min Preferences with Fuhito Kojima and Yusuke Narita in Discrete Applied Mathematics (2014).
Investment Incentives in Labor Market Matching with Fuhito Kojima and Scott Duke Kominers in the American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings (2014).
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks with Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp in the Journal of Political Economy (2013). (Online appendix.)
Vacancies in Supply Chain Networks with Scott Duke Kominers in Economics Letters (2013).
Testing Substitutability with Nicole Immorlica and Scott Duke Kominers in Games and Economic Behavior (2012).
Understanding Price Controls and Non-Price Competition with Matching Theory with Charles R. Plott and Tomomi Tanaka in the American Economic Review Papers & Proceedings (2012).
Matching in Networks with Bilateral Contracts with Scott Duke Kominers, in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (2012).
Substitutes and Stability for Matching with Contracts with Fuhito Kojima in Journal of Economic Theory (2010).
Group Incentive Compatibility in Matching with Contracts with Fuhito Kojima in Games and Economic Behavior (2009).
Strategy-Proof, Efficient, and Nonbossy Quota Allocations in Social Choice and Welfare (2009).
Matching with Contracts: Comment with Fuhito Kojima in the American Economic Review (2008).
Pairwise Kidney Exchange: Comment in the Journal of Economic Theory (2005).
Matching with Contracts with Paul R. Milgrom in the American Economic Review (2005).
Invited Surveys and Policy Comments
Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Matching Markets with Transfers with Scott Duke Kominers in SIGEcom Exchanges (2011).
Comment on the NRMP's "Supplemental Offer and Acceptance Program" Proposed to Replace the Post-Match Scramble with Peter A. Coles, Clayton R. Featherstone, Fuhito Kojima, Scott Duke Kominers, Muriel Niederle, Parag A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth (2010).,
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